In the tattered remains of an air defense base near Damascus, the scale of the physical challenges to rebuilding the Syrian army is clear. Rows of young men in camouflage report for roll call in the shadow of dilapidated, battle-scarred buildings.
The sprawling complex fell into disrepair under ousted President Bashar al-Assad and has since been targeted by Syria’s archfoe Israel.
“We need to start from zero, and this is very difficult,” says Akram, a commander from Eastern Ghouta, surveying the base.
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Syria’s new leadership faces the daunting task of rebuilding an army from the ruins of sectarianism and foreign intervention. The fledgling force has little of material value, but for some, it’s the need for a shift in mindset that is most important.
In Eastern Ghouta, and across the country, commanders like Akram are trying to unify a patchwork of former rebels, including jihadi foreign fighters, into a cohesive, modern force – without the institutional foundations or resources of a traditional military.
More than a decade after Syria’s brutal civil war began, the country’s new leadership faces the daunting task of rebuilding an army from the ruins of sectarianism, warlordism, and foreign intervention. Syria’s fledgling force has little of material value to deal with external threats from Israel or Iran.
But it’s the need for a shift in mindset that preoccupies Akram, who gave only his first name.
“The difficulty is that we toppled a sectarian regime that ruled arbitrarily for 50 years and did everything to serve its own interests rather than those of Syria,” he says. “It didn’t want to form a strong, organized, moderate, and professional army from all sects.”
Unity is the first priority
Now it’s different. There is a vision – if not the necessary means or relevant foundations – to rebuild and modernize the armed forces. Syria’s new authorities count on benefiting from the commitment of tested fighters like Akram and the lessons of a 14-year civil war.
The immediate priority is unity. The difficulty is forming a cohesive force out of a mosaic of former rebels with a broad range of experiences, ideological outlooks, and varying degrees of discipline. On this front, the coordination between rival armed groups to oust Mr. Assad in December marked a promising start.
March delivered a key breakthrough for President Ahmed al-Sharaa, whose former Al Qaeda ties still cause unease in the West. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, Syria’s second-largest military faction and a key ally of the United States against the Islamic State (ISIS), agreed to come under the Damascus-based authorities.
But last month also exposed challenges. The mobilization of some 50,000 Sunni fighters toward the coast to crush an armed insurrection by “regime remnants” proved widespread loyalty to the new president. But the massacre of Alawites underscored the risk of sectarian violence derailing Syria’s transition.
“I don’t think in recent modern history we have seen a DDR [disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration] challenge that is so big and so complex, with so many different players, so many different ideologies, so many different geographies,” noted Charles Lister, director of the Syria Program at the Middle East Institute, at an MEI event.
Syria’s soldiers are typically in their 20s, up to their 40s. Many were civilians-turned-rebels out of necessity – their military know-how gained in the heat of battle, occasionally benefiting from the guidance of defected Assad regime soldiers and foreign advisers. Some came of age under siege and bombs. Others fought in Iraq in the early 2000s or after the Arab Spring in Libya, or trained in ISIS-controlled areas.
Now they want peace, but the army is their best shot at a salary. The know-how that former rebels like Akram gained from foreign allies in their war to oust Mr. Assad – and in the U.S.-led fight against ISIS – is a point of pride. So are the military academies and security structures that Mr. al-Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) set up in Idlib.
Redefining service, and commitment
Abu Ahmed, a dark-bearded commander in Eastern Ghouta, says HTS had a well-structured and long-prepared vision for the rebuilding of the Syrian army. The Officers’ Affairs Office oversees recruitment into the brigades, divisions, and battalions. Enlistment requires a clean history and ideological commitment.
“Bashar al-Assad’s army was based on sectarianism, and the biggest hope of any soldier fighting in that was to return to his home,” he says. “In contrast, the greatest wish of soldiers coming to join us is to die defending their homeland and their religion.”
A major point is what to do with former Assad army officers who did not flee to Lebanon, Iraq, or beyond. “The majority have remained in their homes under surveillance and are forbidden to participate in the Syrian army,” says Akram, noting that about 200 officers have been jailed for alleged war crimes.
Foreign fighters – who helped anti-Assad revolutionaries and gave ISIS and Al Qaeda a foothold in country – are another difficulty. “There is no consideration of sending them back to their countries,” Abu Ahmed says. “They are one of us, and we are one of them. They may even be granted Syrian citizenship.”
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That view is not shared by all Sunni Islamist fighters. Some joke that foreign fighters have become more “relaxed” – a feat they chalk up to marrying local – and now even take part in the widely shared habit of smoking (rather than threatening to blow up gatherings of nicotine addicts).
Others worry that jihadist ideology will hijack Syria’s transition.
“Ultimately, they are not loyal to al-Sharaa,” says Abu Mazen, a Homs native trying to streamline army units. “They are wanted men who can’t go home. They came here to fight a holy war and kill infidels. They know no other program.”
About Iran, and Israel …
Syria’s new army also has external threats to consider.
Reflecting the point of view of the authorities, the Eastern Ghouta commanders say Iran and Israel present the biggest dangers.
Dismantling Iranian influence has been the bigger priority to date, with Shiite militia men reportedly being stripped of Syrian nationality that was granted in gratitude by Mr. Assad. He was dependent on Iranian military and economic support, in addition to that provided by the Shiite Lebanese movement Hezbollah and Syria’s biggest patron, Russia.
The view on Israel is more complex.
“The cost of Bashar al-Assad’s flight was giving Israel access to all-important targets in Syria in exchange for his escape from the country,” says Abu Ahmed. Israel has been regularly bombing Syria since Mr. Assad’s ouster and has claimed fresh slivers of territory in the Golan Heights.
Israeli drones, warplanes, and explosions have become part of the Damascus that Syrians, for now, take in stride. Nevertheless, some Alawites pointedly ask where the calls for holy war are when it comes to Syria’s militarily superior but overstretched neighbor.
Sunnis, who suffered mass displacement and brutal killings for over a decade under Mr. Assad, stress they have no interest in getting dragged into another war. Nonetheless, Mr. al-Sharaa calls Israel’s expansionist moves unacceptable.
“Israel’s movements were anticipated, and we expected even more than that,” says Abu Ahmed. “At the same time, Israel does not have the capacity to engage in another guerrilla war like that in Gaza.”
